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RETAINING THE RULE OF LAW IN ACHEVRON WORLD
MICHAEL A. FITTS*

Few topics have engendered as much scholarly output and debate
over the last few years as statutory construction. In the course of explor
ing the special problems of interpretation in the administrative law con
tent, Professor Strauss's article offers a quite original perspective on
many of these issues. As the breadth of Strauss's discussion reveals, the
traditional court/Congress interpretative paradigm needs to be broad
ened in this context to account for the wide variety of institutions di
rectly involved in the post-enactment interpretative process, including
administrative agencies, Congressional staffs, oversight committees, and
Presidential staff. In particular, this environment raises two special types
of issues for the interpretative enterprise.
First, institutional choice must be made not only between a large
number of different institutional entities, but also in the shadow of com
plicated informal interactions between all of these institutions, which can
undo, or at least modify, any formal investment of authority. Although
these informal processes are increasingly the subject of administrative
law scholarship, in part based on public choice political science, only
recently have we considered how this affects the process of statutory
construction.
Directly related to this institutional choice debate is the traditional
concern in administrative law over vesting authority in officials who may
be viewed as lacking democratic legitimacy- that is, in the proverbial
headless fourth branch of government. Scholars of literary theory have,
by illuminating the discretion inherent in the interpretative process, un
derscored the problem of legitimacy in judicial construction. As Profes··
sors Rubin and Strauss have discussed, delegations to administrative
agencies also occur through explicit as well as implicit processes-vest
ing in unelected bureaucrats a power to interpret necessarily vague lan
guage that might be viewed as equally, if not more, problematic than
judicial construction. 1
Strauss's quite thoughtful piece should be viewed, I think,
*

1.
Strauss,

Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.

as an

at--

See Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 369 (1989);
Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427

( 1989).
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tempt to confront these and other problems of interpretation in the ad
ministrative content. Whatever the value of legislative history elsewhere,
Strauss believes its use is necessary here to deal with the special concerns
raised by administrative interpretation-retaining a rule of law culture in
a politicized post New Deal state. Although I am more sympathetic to
"politics" and "political solutions" than Strauss's "rule of law" approach
appears to be, I ultimately agree with most of his analysis. It is impor
tant, though, to elucidate what I take to be his underlying objectives and
how they fit within administrative law debate-a point that is sometimes
implicit but not explicit in his article. For this reason, my discussion will
focus less on the pure interpretive questions that fill up much of this
symposium, and more on administrative law questions. That is the spe
cial insight in Strauss' piece and also, I shall argue, the best way to appre
ciate the strengths of

his

arguments

as

well

as

their

underlying

assumptions.
l.

ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

For administrative law scholars, the fundamental debate has histori
cally been over the inherent discretion of Executive branch officials. As
Strauss observes, this power is a result of explicit delegations to adminis
trative agencies, as well as the adoption of necessarily vague statutes that
must be given operative meaning by administrative officials in a post

new

deal world. Over the years, a variety of theories have been put

to

rationalize the exercise of administrative discretion-hard

forward
look judi

cial review, public participation through expanded procedures and rights
of intervention, and bureaucratic instrumental expertise, to mention only
a fev.;.2
\Vithout attempting to reach any conclusion on the relative support
for these perspectives, two new approaches, borrowing from modem
political science, seem to have recently gained some note. In effect, each
suggests that

a

different democratically elected institution can and/or

does remain informally responsible for Executive agencies.
The first points to Presidential oversight, via expansion of the Exec
utive Office of the President and Executive order review,
source

for bureaucratic legitimacy. 3

as a

potential

The President, after all, is, iike

members of Congress, democratically elected. Indeed, given that office's
2. See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Adminislrative Law. 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667 (l975).

3. See Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OlYfB in Informal Ruicmaking, 38
ADMIN. L REV. 181 (1986).
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higher level of visibility and national focus, some have viewed the Presi
dency as

more democratic.4 Greater Presidential authority over the bu

reaucracy,

including

exercise

of

its

interpretative

authority

under

Chevron,5 could make the bureaucracy popularly accountable through
the President. Under this analysis, a series of recent legal changes in
creasing Presidential oversight, as well as political changes possibly en
hancing the power of the office, could be viewed as helping to alleviate
problems of administrative legitimacy.
Aside from the President, Congressional oversight has also been ad
vanced as a limit on the fourth branch. An evolving political science
literature has begun to illuminate the numerous informal ways Congress,
especially through committee oversight, is able to exercise significant
control over agency actions. Based on principal/agency theory, which
outlines the informal ways principals may limit their agents, this so
called Congressional dominance literature has suggested Congress may
well exercise extensive control over administrative officials, through
FOIA, GSA, public hearings, and appropriation riders.6 At its strongest,

some

have even suggested administrative actions are explainable largely

in terms of changing personnel and preferences of Congressional com
mittees.7 To the extent this phenomenon occurs, we may not have a seri
ous delegation problem, at least in the way usually claimed. The fourth
branch is under the informal control of either a democratically elected
Congress or President.
Nevertheless, there are p roblems with these "solutions"

call them that)

(if

you can

to the delegation problem. The first is the potential de

cline of the "rule of law" vvhen decisionmaking in a bureaucracy is sub

ject on1y

to

informal controls. Among other t hings, rule of lmiV has
traditionally meant decisionmaking subject to precedent or norms of con

sistency.

In the administrative context, this has led to public decision

making through formulation of general laws or rules, and later their
substantive application by different officials through a separate process,
usually administrative adjudication or ru1emaking.

The normative at

traction of this two step process is somewhat reminiscent of Rawl's veil
of ignorance-serving to excise some knowledge of the substantive mean4.

& 0RG
5.

6.

?v1ashaw, Prode!egation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, I J.L. Ecm·:.

81,

9 5- 99 (1985).

Chevron lJ.S.A., Inc.

v.

Natural R.esources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

ical Co111ro!, J J.L. EcoN. &

ORG. 243

(1987); Fiorina, Legislator UncerTainty, Legislative Control,

and the Defegarion of Legislative Power, 2 J.L. EcoN. &
7.

( 1984).

See, e.g., McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, Administrative Procedures as !nstr..ur.ents of Polii

ORG. 33

(1986).

See, e.g., \Veingast & Moran, The jJfyth of the Runax:ay Bureaucracy, REGULATION, May

June 1982, at 33, 37-38.
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ing and application of general rules or decisions when they are first
promulgated.

Decisionmaking

in

administrative

agencies

through

rulemaking followed by adjudication serves some of this need, but the
informal processes discussed above (such as Presidential, legislative, and
public oversight) tend not to. Indeed, these influences can exacerbate the
problem, as political actors attempt to resolve problems at
specificity

during

the

implementation

stage,

subject

a

high level of

to

no

prior

standards. 8
A second problem with modern delegation is the increasing and sus
tained political divergence in party control of the Executive and legisla
tive branches over the last thirty years.

Obviously, we have long

recognized that administrative personnel, formally the instrumental
agents of Congress, pursue independent goals; this was the standard cri
tique of the new deal agency captured by regulated interest groups

.

9

To

day, however, the Executive branch, if under the control of a President
consistently from a different party than Congress, may be politically op
posed to the substantive programs and policies it is legally charged with
enforcing. 10 While this divergence is perhaps less likely in an era of
strong political parties,

where one party is likely to capture both

branches, today we seem to have institutionalized an adversarial relation
ship between the lawmaking and law applying branches.

To

the extent this is true, Presidential control may undermine the

exercise of delegated authority, not only in the case of specific delega
tions, but interpretative discretion as well. Executive agencies, exercising
their

Chevron discretion, will be less likely to reflect the political goals

and tradeoffs of the Congress that originally adopted the legislation in
the narrowly instrumental fashion that is sometimes assumed in aca
demic debate on administrative delegation. lYioreover, any ongoing "in
terpretative dialogue" between the branches on these issues may be less
likely to bear fruit, let alone converge on a rough consensus.
after all, dealing with two quite distinct political parties

(or

We are,

to use the

current vernacular, "interpretative communities") with potentially quite
different perspectives on various statutory mandates.

Thus, despite the

fact that the President and Congress have many informal controls over
the Executive branch, the concerns of delegation may not only remain;
they may be even greater.
8.

See Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss?: Imperfect Information

Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917. 979 (1990).
9. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING
10.

as

a Posilive

Influence on Political

BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION

See B. GINSBERG & M. SHEFTER, POLITICS BY OTHER rJ1EANS

(1990).

(1955).

1990]
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LEGISLATIVE HiSTORY AS A SOLUTION TO THE DELEGATION
PROBLEM
When all is said and done, Strauss' greatest contribution, I think, is

in confronting and offering a potential solution responding to these two
problems. With respect to the divided control of the Executive and legis
lative branches, Strauss argues that legislative history will serve to shape
and limit the discretion of the Executive branch, usually making it more
faithful to the original enacting body. Although legislative history can
expand the discretion of the interpreting institution, as decisionmakers
pick and choose from the relevant history, Strauss argues, probably cor
rectly, that it often limits discretion and ensures greater faith to the origi
nal Congressional action. Reliance on history can be abused, but so too
can language, which surely cannot be understood absent an understand
ing of social context, including legislative history.
Strauss also suggests that resort to legislative history will help rein
troduce a modified rule of law into bureaucratic decisionmaking in the

Chevron era. While the somewhat artificial distinction between legisla
tive lawmaking and administrative application is enormously compli
cated in our post new deal world, legislative history may serve a modest
rule of law constraint-in effect, helping to give effect to the bureaucratic
and professional

no rm s

that were embodied in the professional goals of

those drafting the statute. Agencies which are required to interpret stat
utes in light of these

preexisting views may reflect a quasi rule of law.
Although Strauss does not develop in detail what values the rule of law
furthers in this context, presumably it is not simply giving effect to bu
reaucratic <:xpertise or increasing the power of the legislative branch per

se. Rather, it appears to be based on the value of decisionmaking made
through previously adopted general rules or decisions. In this sense, the
use of 1egis1ative history may not be the stuff of Hart and Sachs, but
perhaps it is the best vve can do today, where Congress must act through
intransitive legislation.
Of

course,

this conclusion may seem counterintuitive. To some, re

liance on legislative history should

undermine the rule of law, that is, the
subject to a type

need for ''law" to be in the text of the statute, which is

of "legislative due process," rather than in the legislative history alone.
Judge Easterbrook, for example, has suggested that reliance on legislative
history may contravene constitutional requirements of

bicameralism

and

presentmf:nt, since the documents that make up that history do not for-

(Vol.
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Strauss's claim, however, is that textual

interpretation can create greater rule of law concerns in a
since Presidents and bureaucrats will be

Chevron world,

otherwise free to construe legisla

tion absent any preexisting historical constraints. In the informal world
of bureaucratic politics, legislative history may be the best legislative due
process we can have.
This point, which is quite insightful, is critical to Strauss's contracts
analogy, which is more complicated, I think, than it might first seem.
Strauss argues that legislative history should also be relied upon in the
administrative context, where agencies and Congress have repeated inter
actions, for somewhat the same reasons that courts "liberally" construe
contracts where parties have a continuing course of dealings.

In con

tracts law the existence of extensive dealings supposedly offers a source
for better understanding of the parties "agreement" and how it should be
applied and updated. Likewise, in the administrative context, it might be
suggested, we should look beyond the formal agreement-the language
of the legislation-to include an analysis of the outside interactions, as
captured at least partly in the legislative history.
There is something to this analogy, but it is ultimately persuasive
only if understood in the context of the two delegative concerns outlined
above, as Strauss, I think, recognizes.

If we were to apply rigidly the

rationale of the contracts literature alone, the agencies and courts would
look not only at the legislative history (that is, relax the parole evidence
rule),

but

also

branches as well.

subsequent

interactions

and

interpretations

of

the

By analogy to the contracts theory, the full relation

ship between the parties, including their

evolving interactions, should be

understood in interpreting the "meaning" of their agreement. After all,
it is this evolving relationship which justifies resort to sources outside the
agreement.

But the argument for legislative history generally seeks to

limit updating of the agreement in light of the changing relations.
Strauss does not want administrative officials interpreting statutes in
light of the

current

relationship with the President or Congrtss; to the

contrary, he wishes them to be bound to the full

original agreements and

understandings by expanding those "agreements" to include legislative
history.

Administrative officials are supposed to rely on legislative his

tory in the process of

resisting current pressures from the President or

oversight committees. In this sense, the contracts literature would

11.

See, e.g.,

Easterbrook,

Easterbrook, Staiutes

Domains, 50 U. 0-11. L. REV. 533, 54 7

f.J,'har Does Legislative History Te!i Us? 66 CHI.- KENT L. REV. 441

( 1983).
( 1990).

seem

See also

1990]
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to count

against the thesis.12

This explains why the other two factors discussed above are critical
to the argument. The desire not to update the statute is ultimately based
on these two additional concerns-the desire to further the rule of law
and limit the consequences of the change in "parties"

(i.e., administra

tions). Strauss's claim, I think, is that this need is especially important in
the informal repeat player context of administrative construction because
of the inordinate pressure to overlook the rule of law. In this network of
informal relations, we are especially unlikely to protect such values. In
addition, there also may be more that is valuable in that history because
we are dealing with repeat players, engaging in communication and dia
logue within their own community off the formal record.13 Taking all of
these arguments

together, therefore, offers a quite textured argument for

reliance on legislative history.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT

The thesis, however, does raise important policy questions.
importantly,

as

Most

noted above, this approach could be viewed, from an

other perspective, as

undermining its primary objective-furthering the

rule of law. Lawyers are often unclear about exactly what ends are being
served by the "n1le of law". As a general matter, it requires acting sub

ject
ject

to or consistent \vith previously agreed on rules or decisions, or sub
to some form of due process. As a practical matter, it is sometimes

taken simply to mean giving effect to the expertise of bureaucrats, the
prior

judgments

of legislative actors, or dividing interpretative

In many cases, however, the line between law and

power.
politics can be

quite thin, with vague rule of law protections having serious political im
plications.
12.

Legislative histo ry , for example, can be very general, easily

I don't believe Strauss would disagree with this analysis, which purports to be merely

a

restatement of his argument. At some points, however, he might be viewed as suggesting the con

tracts iiterature independently justifies resort to legislative history. For example, he says:

C:Jntext-both at the time of drafting and as revealed in subsequent life under the con
tract-are essential both to accommodate the legal order to the realities of the setting in
which contracting is going on, and to understand how the parties reasonably viewed the
parameters of the relationship. The analogy to the problem of legislative history in the
agency context ought to be obvious . . .

Denying force to the political history of intransi·

tive legislation is inconsistent with the reality of the setting within which legislation occurs

and with the way in which agency and the legislature reasonably view the para:-neters of
their relationship.

Strauss, supra note 1, at 49-50.

Taken alone, this appears to justify looking not only at legislative

history, but also at the "subsequent life under the contract." Strauss, however, wishes to place a
limit on such "updating," by making legislative history and text more binding.

! 3.

Th oug h one could argue the opposite, namely, that expert drafters should be be tte r able to

include <he relevant information in the statute. From this perspective, we should be more suspicious
about their failure to do so. See

infra.
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manipulated later by executive branch officials with special career or in
stitutional objectives. Bureaucrats may merely be furthering their per
sonal policy by saying "We've built up a set of expectations that will
unravel if we go that way".14 To the extent history is buried in ambigu
ous committee reports or internal bureaucratic memos, it can often be
come the

rationalization for a subsequent position, the method by which

committee or bureaucratic interests are resurrected, rather than any rule
of law

limitation. 15 Because we are dealing with sophisticated repeat

players, there may be more in those files which is relevant, but also there
may be more potential for abuse, especially as against less sophisticated
Presidential appointees or non-oversight committee members of Con
gress.16 This would be especially true if the same persons who drafted
the legislative history are the ones interpreting it. The ability to both set
and interpret precedent may reduce any rule of law constraint.17
Beyond the generality and malleability of some legislative history,
there remains a question about its procedural pedigree-a traditional
rule of law concern. In the eyes of some bureaucrats, legislative history
includes informal "understandings" and "exchanges."

Unfortunately,

these internal memos, subcommittee testimony, and the like may be less
subject to legislative due process-that is, public congressional scru
tiny-than committee reports on legislation, or legislation itself. Legisla
tion is a social, not a two person contract.
For similar reasons, resort to legislative history may further a cer
tain type of democratic accountability, but occasionally undermine an
other. While legislative history may make the Executive branch more
accountable to past legislative enactments, it may

also increase the influ

ence of the legislative committees within that branch as well as empower
the bureaucracy vis-a-vis a recently elected President. To be sure, most
of these legislative documents are generally available to the rest of Con
gress and the President, who retain formal control.18 The informal un
derstandings, however, are less likely to be scrutinized.

Many scholars

still express concern over the informal influence of the "iron-triangles",
14. See
15.

Strauss, supra note

I.

Many who have served in the Executive branch (including myselt) have frequently observed

agency officials presenting a one-sided review of the history of a program, or creating a one-sided
history in the agency's or committee's files in the first place.
16.

To this extent, rule of law might mean requiring legislative drafters to place that informa

tion in the statute itself, not simply in the legislative history, which can be more easily manipulated.

17.

In this sense, reliance on legislative history by agencies may be different than by courts,

which are not involved in the initial drafting, as Strauss argues, but for reasons sometimes undermin

ing the rule of iaw analogy.
18. See G. Cox & M. McCuBBINS, PARTIES AND CoMMITTEES
RESENTATIVES (1989 Draft).
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which represent the classic principal agency problem.

If significant,

these forces may gain influence by any blanket resort to legislative his
tory or increased bureaucratic hegemony-influence against a popular
elected President.
This brings into focus the institutional choices implicit in this type
of debate. Which institutions should be given greater interpretative (and
therefore substantive) power in these various contexts: enacting Con
gresses or committees; current Congresses or committees; current or past
bureaucrats; current Presidents?

In the aftermath of Chevron Strauss

fears that we lean too far in favor of current Presidents, and wishes to
invigorate past Congresses.
If the issue is framed in such bald institutional terms, I have to con
fess that I worry, for the reasons stated above, about the impact of any
blanket embrace of legislative history on agency, committee and Presi
dential influence. At least in the abstract, I am probably more sanguine
than some others about the value of Presidential powers over the long

run

and the benefits of updating statutes in our post new deal worl d. 19 Lib
eral interpretation of stat u tes by Presidents and their administrations can
undermine the rule of law, as did the demise of the no n -d elegation doc
trine, but also can further public and political accountability. Ov:::r th�
years, Presidents and their administrations may be more visible and ac
countable than administrative officials who are merely gi vi n g effect \o
professional norms and understandings.
In this regard, I also am concerned with the problems createc� by
divided branches, which can be exacerbated by increased bureancratic
hegemony. Strauss implicitly argues in favor of strengthening the reach
of past Congresses and the permanent bureaucracy.

\Nhile divisions in

responsibility further traditional checks and balances they can also r.-md
dle political and bureaucratic responsibility. Good law may be in tension
with good politics at some point. Although present day liberals may be
less disturbed by this prospect, we should remember that

a

modtrn

Roosevelt or Kennedy would be subject to the same im pediments .
In light of the political implications of these issues, it might be hei:p·
ful if we co u ld resolve these choices subject to some constraint like

a

vet\

of ig norance , not knowing v;ho or which ideology would be emp:)wen:,:·i
by a particular allocation. 20 Indeed, over the long

run,

the idecllogiud

Inman & Fitts, Poiiticai Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. i-Ji:c·ro ..·i.-::r:!!
( 1990); Fitts & Inman, Con!ra/ling Congres.>: Pn:si
dential Infi'uence in Domestic Fiscal Policy, - GEO. LJ. - (forthcoming).
20. See Fitts, supra note 8. Put another way, any rule of decision would need tc l:ie sc:i:�ect c•) 2
19.

Record, 6 J. L EcoN. & ORG. 79, Special Issue

long time horizon.
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implications should balance out. Perhaps academics would be able to
reach a greater level of agreement; at a minimum, practitioners of politics
might be more concerned with institution building, since groups would
be less likely to view institutions in narrowly ideological terms. Unfortu
nately, institutions have become increasingly identified with particular
ideologies, complicating this and other separation of powers debates. It
is to Strauss's credit that he notes the political implications of these
choices, but ultimately seeks to resolve his institutional recommenda
tions, as I try to do, in broader social principles.
In the end, though, all of these concerns are grounds only for read
ing legislative history with greater care, not for ignoring it altogether.
Remaining sensitive to the processes by which legislative history is gener
ated can minimize abuse, without throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. There are iron triangles and strategic players operating in
·washington, but there are also hardworking bureaucrats attempting to
confront difficult problems in a state,

as they say,

of

"imperfect

information".
When all is said and done, much of our skepticism of legislative
history is predicated on a strategic model of self-interested actors slipping
material into law without popular review or acceptance. If one adopts
the popular zero transaction cost, self-interest paradigm, this analysis has
some appeal. Indeed, it is almost tautological: Why would anything re
main in the legislative history

unless its proponents feared their inability

to gain its acceptance from the rest of Congress and the President?
In most cases, however, the ambiguities in statutes are not strategic;
the failure to elucidate an objective is usually a mistake in foresight or

a

reflection of informal bureaucratic norms, not of political manipulation.
With regard to many matters of interpretation, the bureaucracy and rele
vant committees of Congress are part of a relatively consensual commu
nity. In these cases, resort to legislative history is more likely to further
the rule of law, in the sense described above, than the rule of bureaucratic
politics. Even though I might rate the risk, and the need for vigilance in
reading that history, higher than some others, 21 in the end I agr ee with
Professor Strauss that it would be folly to deprive interpreters of its
insights.

2!.

See Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Viriue

Legislative Process, l 36 U. PA. L REv. !567, 160 l

(1988).
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